The Milewski
Polish Studies
Lecture

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THE CHALLENGES OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY AT THE OUTSET OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Ambassador Przemysław Grudziński
of the Republic of Poland

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The Milewski Polish Studies Lecture

In 1990 by Dr. Stanislaw and Mrs. Anita Milewski endowed the Milewski Polish Studies Lecture at Central Connecticut State University in honor of their parents, Alfred and Sabina Milewski and Maria and Jerzy Dobiecki. The lecture is devoted to key issues in the modern history of Poland.

Dr. Stanisław Milewski’s life is a reflection of Poland’s modern history. He was born in Bargowo, Poland on June 16, 1930. After World War II began, he was deported on January 10, 1940 to Russia northeast of the city of Archangel. He left Russia with the Army of General Władysław Anders in 1942, and served with the Polish Cadet Corps between 1943 and 1947 in Barbara, which was near Gaza in Palestine. As a result of the war, the Milewski family became part of a new Polish diaspora. The young Milewski attended Medical School at Trinity College at the University of Dublin from 1950 to 1956. He received his training in ophthalmology at the Gill Memorial Hospital in Virginia, and then did his fellowship in surgery and diseases of the retina and vitrous at the Massachusetts Eye-Ear Infirmary at Harvard Medical School in Boston. Dr. Milewski is an Assistant Clinical Professor of Ophthalmology at the University of Connecticut. He is in active practice in the Hartford area, specializing in surgery and disorders of the retina and vitrous. He has lectured in the United States and trained Polish physicians in his specialization.

Dr. Milewski is a prominent member of the Polish community. He served as a president of the Connecticut District of the Polish American Congress and is a member of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, the Kościuszko Foundation, and the Józef Piłsudski Institute of America. He is a long-time friend and supporter of the Polish Studies Program at CCSU.

Kazmierz Dziewanowski, the first non-communist Polish ambassador to the United States after World War II, inaugurated the Milewski Polish Studies Lecture in 1990. His successor, Jerzy Kozmiński, spoke at CCSU on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Connecticut District of the Polish American Congress in 1994. CCSU is pleased to welcome their successor as Ambassador of the Republic of Poland, Dr. Przemysław Grudziński.

Ambassador Grudziński was born in Toruń in 1950. He studied history at the Mikołaj Kopernik University in Toruń and continued his studies at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (1976 – 1990) where he was an associate professor.

Ambassador Grudziński speaks English, German and Russian.

The Polish Studies Program is pleased to publish Ambassador Grudziński’s lecture for the permanent record. Our sincere appreciation is extended to Dr. and Mrs. Stanislaw Milewski for making the Milewski Polish Studies Lecture possible. Our hope is that the dissemination of the Milewski Lecture will promote great awareness of Polish public policy issues and discussions.

Stanislaus A. Blejwas
CSU University Professor of History
Holder of the Endowed Chair in Polish and Polish American Studies
Challengers for Polish Foreign Policy at the Outset of the 21st Century

Honorable Przemysław Grudziński
Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the United States of America

The Milewski Polish Studies Lecture
Central Connecticut State University
New Britain, Connecticut
May 7, 2001
Dear Professor Blejwas,
Distinguished Scholars and Guests
of Central Connecticut State University,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am truly honored and privileged to be here today. The invitation
to deliver the annual Milewski Polish Studies Lecture has given me an
additional pleasure but also it has added a burden of responsibilities to my
task. It is not easy to be up to the expectations following such prominent
speakers in recent years like Professors Piotr Wandycz, Norman
Davies, and Władysław Bartoszewski, and Ambassador Kazimierz
Dziewanowski. What I can promise, however, is that will do my best.

But first of all I would like to thank Professor Stanislaus Blejwas
for inviting me here and to thank for his outstanding work, time and energy
devoted to the success of the Endowed Chair of Polish Studies at
Central Connecticut State University. Since its establishment in 1997 and
Professor Blejwas’ assumption of the Chair, the Chair has had a signifi-
cant impact on broadening the general knowledge and awareness of
Polish history, Poland’s culture heritage as well as its today’s political and
social realities. Dear Professor, I want to tell you that my task as the
Polish Ambassador to the United States in undoubtedly much easier to
accomplish when we have people like you right on the spot.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In my lecture today I would like to focus on as issue that certain-
ly is going to draw the close attention to politicians and analysts dealing
with European, especially Central and Eastern European issues in the
years to come. We have gathered here today to discuss challenges for
Polish foreign policy as we move forward into the new millennium.

Trying to make an attempt to describe Poland’s new role in the
changed geopolitical landscape after the end of the Cold War, first of all,
I will focus on current priorities and challenges for our policy both in the
regional and transatlantic dimensions. Secondly, I will touch upon aspects
of the ongoing debate on the future of European affairs and its meaning
for Poland. And finally, I would like to share with you my thoughts on
Poland’s role in global international affairs.

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact marked the most significant change in the world's geopolitics. At the same time, the Polish people take great credit for playing a significant role in dismantling the Soviet system from within. The birth of the Solidarity movement in 1980 with moral and spiritual support from Pope John Paul II brought about the first cracks and rifts in the communists' rule. As a result of Poland's disobedience and the uncompromising policy of the West, especially the United States, social and political processes were triggered across Central and Eastern Europe that eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and next, to the demise of the Soviet Union. Consequently, not only Poland and other young democracies became free to choose their own ways of political, economic, and cultural development, but they also regained the natural right to decide about the future alliances as well as directions and priorities of their foreign policies.

As our foreign policy priorities were being shaped and consolidated at the beginning of the 1990s, three of them came to the forefront. First, to normalize our relations with the neighbors. Second, to gain full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. And third, to integrate with the European Union [EU].

As far as our relations with the neighbors were concerned, a genuine reconciliation with unified Germany was of crucial importance. To a large extent, transformation in Poland created a favorable political environment for the unification of both German states according to the constitution of the Federal Republic. In practical terms, the Ostland merged into the "Western core" without any limitation of its presence in NATO or in the European Union. This historic process was strongly supported by the Polish government as it offered a chance for the German state to become firmly rooted in the system of broad security cooperation. This in turn made it feasible for the West to go ahead with the policy of broadening and sustaining democracy and a free market economy in the Eastern flank. The future NATO enlargement was a consequence of this way of thinking.

Another key element for Polish foreign policy at the time was Ukraine. Poland became the first country in the world to recognize this country's independence. The basic concept for that was the assumption that a free and independent Ukraine would be the major obstacle to any attempt
to rebuild the Soviet Empire or reestablish a new Russian zone of influence.

In spite of today’s political, economic and social turbulence in Ukraine, we feel that there is no other option for Poland but to remain engaged with our eastern neighbor for better or worse. It is not only our moral obligation but also an effort to rule out any new divisions in Europe. If I were to point out the most challenging issue for Polish foreign policy with regard to the region of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine would be the first and foremost of them.

What I also want to stress here is that our policies toward Ukraine along with a genuine involvement of Polish non-governmental organizations reflect a broad consensus in Poland as far as the need of engagement with our neighbor is concerned. In our view, an independent Ukraine is an indispensable factor for a new post-Cold-War order on the European continent.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Efforts to represent our aspiration in foreign policy in the logic of security and stability of the whole region gained for Poland at the beginning of the 1990s a special role in Central Europe. A comprehensive strategy based on the principle of solidarity and parallel security interests resulted in granting Poland the leading role among nations in the region. The basic idea was that further enhancement of democracy and security in whatever Central European country was about bringing more stability for neighboring nations. This stance stood Poland in good stead when applying for the NATO membership. Eventually, it won support for the Polish candidacy among the actual members of NATO. Additionally, our good relations with Russia proved to be a constructive input to the Alliance.

I must tell you that despite all ups and downs in the Polish-Russian relations over the last several years, we have recently been successful in significantly improving our bilateral relations with Russia. Poland has always represented a positive attitude towards this country. A stable and democratic Russia in undoubtedly in our own interest, in the interest of Europe, and in the world’s interest.

Poland’s role in Central Europe, reaching out to Ukraine and Russia while promoting the region’s interest in the West – those are
factors that gained respect for Poland on the international arena. Moreover, Poland as an example of the most spectacular success of economic transformation has already had a stabilizing impact on other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the Polish case has become a horsepower to display the region’s creative and entrepreneurial spirit of political and economic transformation. Our aim in the future will be to retain our position in the region in order to possibly broaden the sphere of democratic values, open society, and free market economy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Since Poland’s accession into NATO two years ago, Poles can live in confidence that the security of our country is firmly set in a multinational, transatlantic framework of free and democratic countries. But today we are obligated to focus our attention on the future of the Alliance. Poland feels bound to seek every possible means to keep NATO credible, cohesive and efficient. We are quite positive about the idea that an effective NATO should play the key role in the Euro-Atlantic security system.

As a NATO and future EU member, Poland welcomed the initiative of the European Union aimed at strengthening its Common Foreign and Security Policy by way of developing the European Security and Defense Policy [ESDP]. We expressed our readiness to fully participate in the shaping of European political and defense capabilities that will increase Europe’s abilities to respond effectively in crisis situations. However, it is NATO that, in our view, remains the only reliable guarantor of security in Europe. Thus, the development of the ESDP can neither lead to undermining NATO’s role nor withering its effectiveness and solidarity.

We are convinced that the Euro-Atlantic bond between Europe and America serves well the security and stability of the Old Continent. The concurrence of the integration processes, good relations and transparency between the European Union and NATO – this, precisely, offers a chance for Polish security and economic prosperity.

As a sign of support and solidarity with other European countries, Poland will seek close cooperation with its allies towards future NATO enlargement. We attach particular importance to the “open door” principle reiterated in Washington by the NATO summit, a principle that will eventually lead to enlarging the Alliance by admitting new members.
In our opinion, the cause of European security will be served well if—following Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—new countries of our region gain the rights and assume the responsibilities stemming from the Treaty of Washington.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

One of the greatest opportunities for Polish foreign policy is the development of our bilateral relations with the United States. After our accession into NATO these relations became for the first time in history that of a fully allied nature. One could ask, what makes us allies today? I believe it is not merely membership in a political and military alliance. There is much more than that. It is the values that we share together like democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. It is also a common strategic goal, which is security of the transatlantic community as well as our commitments to gradually broaden the sphere of peace and prosperity throughout the world.

Both the Polish and American governments share a common vision that the NATO Alliance should play a decisive role in the Euro-Atlantic security system. At the same time, we recognize that America is as much important for Europe as stability of the Old Continent is crucial for America’s security. Moreover, it is in our national interest to ensure the continued U.S. presence in Europe and commitment to its affairs, especially in the areas of security, investment, and advanced technology, as well as American support for the processes of political and economic transformation taking place in Central and Eastern Europe.

While developing bilateral relations with the United States, we will be focusing as well on Polish-American cooperation in sustaining the democratic and free market transformation of other states of the region. In this connection, we pin great hopes on the Polish-American Freedom Foundation inaugurated last year, aim of which is to strengthen the private sector and promote the idea of open society and the rule of law in neighboring countries.

Generally speaking, long-term objectives of Polish foreign policy reflect the nature of close and strong ties with the United States. The state of our bilateral relations enhances Poland’s position vis-à-vis the European Union today and will do so after our accession into the EU. While trying to fully integrate with European structures, Poland
cannot pretend that the United States is of lesser importance than it is. Our position stems from the recognition that, prior to its accession, Poland, being the biggest among the aspiring countries, it trying to overcome large problems regarding structural deficiencies in such sectors of its economy as agriculture, coal-mining, and the steel industry. This is why Poland stresses the need of transparency in the economic dialog between the US and the EU. We want to make sure that American investments, as important as they are, find a good environment in Poland as a European Union candidate country and later as an EU member.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me now touch upon the complex processes today under way in Europe. In most debates about the future of the European continent, one can see a division of minds between those who maintain that the nation-states and the balance of power among them will continue to be the key element in the European political equation; and those who tend to emphasize the role of institutions and other cooperative arrangements as factors that will gradually alert the nature of Europe’s political landscape. In Robert Cooper’s terms, this is the division between the “modernist” and “postmodern” approach. These two perspectives represent a competition of views on Europe’s future that is taking place in real political life: among European countries themselves, but especially between Russia and the West.

In the context, it is interesting to take a look at the current debate on the future of the European Union. This is what draws the close attention of the United States and what seems to be of crucial importance not only for EU members but also for aspiring countries, including Poland. Essentially, any significant changes in the European landscape are going to have an impact on the future shape of the transatlantic link as well as on American’s and the EU’s relations with Russia. This is why discussions today go along two parallel tracks. One is the future of the European Union itself while the other concentrates on possibilities of cooperation between the US and the EU on the one hand and Russia on the other.

As German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stressed in his famous speech last year and was confirmed by President Jacques Chirac of France shortly thereafter, no one currently seems to seriously support the idea of a European state that would eventually have replaced or erased the old nation-states. The issues under consideration include rather the depth and scale of integration.
Poland's position is that the European Union, adjusted and prepared to accept new members, should promote and protect nations' common interest in political, security and economic areas. From a historic and moral point of view, integration on the European continent gives a unique opportunity for the people of Europe to get rid of, once and for all, the danger of war and divisions along artificially created political lines.

I would like to turn your attention to the very promising aspects of Joschka Fischer's speech. What I found particularly important was the emphasis put on the idea of integration not only in economic and short-term political dimensions. First of all, it was presented as a chance to give all European nations a historic opportunity to embark on a process that was a natural consequence of the end of the Cold War. In my opinion, this particular point of view puts the European integration in the right perspective. It is to say not if but when the process will take on a new dynamics. It is to say, all are invited; we do not exclude anyone. Finally, and this is a sign of special German sensitivity, it is to say let us overcome the ghost of the past together. This gives all of us a chance to create an effective Pan-European entity without compromising our national feelings. I am not necessarily willing to try to describe the future entity as a "confederation" of "federation". But nevertheless, I welcome with relief the growing conviction among European leaders that the process is indispensable for the stability and peaceful development of the whole European continent.

In the near future, the first and foremost challenge will be the issue of how to reform the European institutions in order to embrace new members from Central and Southern Europe. An important question will be how to accommodate demands of both members and aspiring countries regarding their future influence on the decision-making process within the EU. Decisions taken during last year's Nice summit seem to be the first step to the way towards finding the best possible solution. The compromise that was achieved took into account the need for active participation of candidate states in the EU's internal discussion prior to their accession.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The European debate is just as important for the United States as it is for the nations of Europe. There is no wonder that from over the Atlantic we can hear voices and opinions on how the European affairs are
evolving. One of them, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s study “Living with a new Europe” is particularly worth closer attention. Being right about Europe’s important role for the United States and for the global stability, he correctly stressed that America cannot stand-alone in the world. However, the existing asymmetry in political and military dimensions resulting in occasional tensions between the US and the European Union may be dangerous for the future of the transatlantic link. Current efforts on the European part to enhance its political weight along with its military capabilities are, and should be, aimed at balancing this asymmetry while preserving the transatlantic alliance. What is more, the EU’s task is not to become the United States of Europe. Nor is it supposed to follow the American way of creating a unified entity. Professor Brzezinski is right stressing significant historical differences and current cultural, social and economic distinctions between the two.

One has to agree that European integration faces many challenges stemming from different national interests, levels of economic development, and, at times conflicting visions of how to proceed. It does not mean that Europe should abandon an ambitious vision of getting its nations closer together. Even if we adopt a more pragmatic approach, the direction seems to be obvious: to move forward. The ultimate task of this long-lasting process is durable peace, stability, and creating of favorable conditions for further economic growth on the continent. And indeed, this is not what America should be afraid of. An integrated Europe will not be a rival of the United States. On the contrary, it is set to be a more responsible and reliable partner on the international arena.

Poland’s position is that EU’s expansion should not significantly disturb the process of deeper integration. In Brzezinski’s terms, the processes of horizontal and vertical growth should be parallel. It is conceivable, however, that the accession of new members will temporarily weaken the vertical dimension of integration. But nevertheless, it will be the European nations themselves who will choose how to proceed and what pace of integration to adopt. It is likely that some countries will get closer together in certain areas of cooperation and institutional integration while others will pursue less dynamic strategies. However, it is crucially important that any process of creating an inner core composed of more integrated EU countries be conducted on voluntary and inclusive rather than exclusive basis.

No less important is the issue of how the transatlantic community
will shape its relations with Russia. David Calleo has recently presented three possible scenarios of development in this area in his study called "A Choices of Europes". The first of them presents a vision of Russia alienated by an integrated and all-embracing transatlantic community. The second depicts Russia as a possible NATO and EU member in a broad Eurasian system. According to the third scenario, Russia becomes something of an equal partner in a triangular cooperation with the US and the EU.

Considering the current situation, it is highly unlikely that Russia would become a member of the EU or NATO anytime soon. However, we must bear in mind the importance of relations with this country. A potential source of instability, Russia cannot be left out. The policy of engagement and establishing close economic relations with Russia should be one of the transatlantic community’s major tasks. It is important that the policy towards Russia be closely coordinated and pursued jointly by both the US and the EU. We should also ensure that any attempts on the Russian part to drive a wedge between Europe and the US are doomed to fail right at the start.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Poland has strong sense of European identity. I am convinced that as a member of the European Union Poland will be capable of making an important, original and constructive contribution to its activity, having such significant assets as the size of its territory and its location in the center of Europe bordering on the vast and still unstable post-Soviet region; a population of almost forty million, a dynamically expanding economy; an educated society; and most of all – a democratic state ruled by law that guarantees protection of human rights. We are ready to share our experience with those nations that are at the very beginning phase of the transformation process. Knowledge and understanding of the East is one of our assets that we are prepared to share in an effort to engage countries like Russia and Ukraine.

Describing Poland’s vision on the future of European affairs, I would like to refer to what former Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek said: “If I were to choose the instrument, which from the viewpoint of Poland constitutes the best way of building the prosperity of Europe as it enters the 21st century, I would point to the method of integration as the one that effectively consolidates security and enhances
economic growth. Integration is not limited just to the role of NATO and the EU, but is also signifies our own involvement in subregional initiatives and the creation of a network of bilateral links. Its aim is not to isolate but to attract others to join action in pursuit of positive goals.

The vision along with long-term goals that Poland has set draws the close attention of those my American colleagues who analyze and try to predict the development of political and economic relations on the European continent.

But Poland also wants to play an active role in broader international affairs. When considering the role of nations in today’s world, one can adopt what can be called a paradigm of national interests. To some extent, this approach implies a moment of conflict and rivalry since one can hardly imagine a perfect harmony of interests among independent political entities. Although discord and conflict may be the normal state of affairs among states, it is also important to gain insight as to why relations among most European states have been generally peaceful since World War II. It is true to say that European institutionalization that started during the Cold War has pulled West European states together in creating frameworks of economic, political and military cooperation in which extreme national policies are discouraged. Today, through its policy of enlargement, Western Europe is also extending this new approach of cooperative security towards much of Central Europe. The “logic of enlargement” that underlines the policies of NATO and the EU is clearly based on this assumption. It argues that participation within international institutions influences the perception and articulation of a state’s national interests, and will in the long term redefine the character of the nation-state itself. It claims that the order in west European economics and politics can largely be attributed to the growth of multilateral institutions that have helped states to identify their common interest and have provided effective procedures for settling disputes. In analyses of European security this is now the dominant approach. It also underpins the concept of a Western security community that has evolved over the past four decades, as well as the foreign policy goal of “enlargement”. It logically follows that the concept of spheres of interest and the traditional notion that nation-states compete for power and influence are no longer politically correct in much of the West. At the same time, it would be utterly idealistic to assume that the world as a whole can emulate the European achievement of building a viable security community. Hence, the moderating impact of the “institutional” approach will for the foreseeable
future mainly applies to Europe while a nation-state perspective will still prevail in most other part of the globe. I do hope that processes of globalization will gradually strengthen the tendency towards institutionally integrated cooperation in security and political fields all over the world.

From the Polish perspective, it is important to stimulate what I call mutually reinforcing tides of good will and promising trends in sometimes chaotic, as the appear, world’s affairs. Poland, hopefully in the scheme of the broadest possible international cooperation, will put every effort in the process of improving relations among nations. A glaring example of those efforts was the Poland’s role last year in organizing the conference “Towards a Community of Democracies”. The event brought to Warsaw governmental officials from over 100 countries to jointly deliberate on the condition of democracy the world over, on the threats and challenges that confront it, as well as the possible ways of cooperation and provision of international assistance aimed at spreading and consolidating democracy. This initiative proved that democratic institutions are closely linked to the idea of individual liberties. They also reflect the need and dreams of people from all over the world irrespectively of cultural differences and national belonging.

Today’s world is not simpler or less difficult than it used to be. Although the security situation after the Cold War had changed fundamentally, we still live in a threatened world if not in the world of threats. And we are still looking for a durable international order and ways to address sources of international instability. There are challenges and problems in front of us that we have to face if we want our future to be brighter and more peaceful. The changing nature of some of those challenges requires more often different and a more pro-active approach. In global terms, instability – stemming from differences in economic development, ethnic conflicts, illegal immigration, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime – is the main point of concern. What the instability-creating factors have in common is that most of the times they transcend nations’ geographic borders. Virtually no country in the world can nowadays determine that one or another problem is of no concern. The transnational challenges demand closer international cooperation in many aspects and many fields including bilateral and multilateral agreements, exchanging sensitive information and data, technological and logistical support, etc.

Poland’s intention is to work along with all countries that want to
address these issues and problems. In pursuing its policies, Poland is looking for possibilities to find new ways to join with other capable and like-minded nations. We cooperate with our allies, regional partners and utilize international institutions such as the United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE].

Today, as the big picture looks rather complicated, it is our task and mission to put possible efforts to improve international relations and secure a more stable world for future generations. Poland sees this task also as a debt to pay to those who helped the Polish transformation succeed and as a sign of support for those who are at the beginning of what seems to be a long and winding road. It is our will and moral duty to share ideas and experiences with those countries. As Professor Bronisław Geremek once put it: “The peaceful revolution in Poland and also in neighboring countries of Central Europe took place under the call for Solidarity. It is now high time to give this idea a much more international, if not global meaning.”

When it comes to ideas that proved to have an impact on peoples’ lives, we believe that what brought changes in Poland, in certain limits, can be beneficial elsewhere.

Ladies and Gentlemen
Dear Friends,

Poland has entered the 21st century as a free and independent country. In the last decade, the wisdom and vision of the Polish leadership helped build for the country a policy of an active and effective international player. Of course, we could not have achieved this alone. The spectacular success has come with the help of friends and allies but, first of all, with the strong and consistent support from members of Polish communities around the world. Today Poland is a country we can be proud of and this is a policy that we can be proud of as well. On the one hand, this is a policy based on the sense and awareness of our interests. At the same time, it is built on the grounds of moral and political ideals among which are: solidarity, peaceful cooperation, and reaching out to those who are in need.

There are, however, challenges as well as opportunities ahead of us that I wanted to bring to your attention. Since few things in this world seem to be fixed and stable forever, we should rather see our goals as ever looming on the horizon with a winding and sometimes arduous road ahead.

Thank you for your attention.
Polish Studies at Central Connecticut State University

The Polish Studies Program at Central Connecticut State University is a unique endeavor. It contributes to the diversity and strength of Central as a University, and is the only active program of its kind in New England with roots both on the campus and in the community. The Program, inaugurated in January 1974, seeks to preserve and to stimulate awareness of Poland’s history and contributions to European and world civilizations. The Program’s core is courses in history, politics, culture, literature, language, and on the Polish American ethnic community. The Polish Heritage Collection in the University Library, numbering over 18,000 catalogued books and periodicals, supplements the course offerings. The Connecticut Polish American Archives is a research depository for the public, scholars and students of the Polish community in America. It is supported in part by the Alex M. Rudewicz Endowment.

The Program sponsors lectures, cultural events, exhibits, recitals and concerts, and literary evenings. Activities include the Fiedorczyk Lecture in Polish American Studies, the Milewski Lecture in Polish Studies, the Godlewski Evening of Polish Culture, the Koproski Lecture on Polish Economy and Business, the Nowakowski Conversations about Poland, and the Alex and Regina Rudewicz Polish Music Series. The Martin & Sophie Grzyb Prize for Excellence in Polish Studies is awarded in recognition of student achievement and The Polish Invitational Golf Committee and Mr. Alex Federowicz have endowed scholarships for students born in Poland. Endowments by Monsignor John P. Wodarski and Mr. Henry A. Gajda underwrite publications of the Polish Studies Program.

The Copernican Polish Heritage Endowment, which is located in the CCSU Foundation, Inc., supports all aspects of Polish Studies at the University. Donors are commemorated on the plaque in the University Library. Individuals, families, businesses, and organizations are listed in the following categories: Founders ($1,000), Benefactors ($500), Friends ($250), and Patrons ($100). A person, family, business, or organization may wish to endow ($10,000) a special lecture, a named scholarship, a book and publishing fund, a fund for exchange professors from Poland, a student exchange, or some other activity. These donations are commemorated with individual bronze plaques that are also in the University Library.

On October 29, 1997 the generosity of Connecticut’s Polish Americans and their friends and a matching grant of $600,000 from the State of Connecticut permitted the inauguration of the Chair in Polish and Polish American Studies. A major donation is sought to name the Chair. For further information contact Professor Stanislaus A. Blejwas, the Coordinator of Polish Studies ([860] 832-2814) or Mr. Nick Petrinico, the Vice-President for University Advancement ([860] 832-1765), Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, CT 06050-4010.